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DECONSTRUCTING CAPUTO'S

DEMYTHOLOGIZING HElD EGGER
George Connell

John Caputo's Demythologizing Heidegger represents an important, distinctive,
and intriguing attempt to make sense of Heidegger's notorious involvement
with Nazism. Where others have tended to emphasize biographical and sociological factors in understanding Heidegger's involvement with Nazism,
Caputo traces that involvement to fateful turns in Heidegger's development as
a thinker. While I am sympathetic with such an undertaking, I find Caputo's
account highly questionable and even self-opposed, especially as regards his
apparent valorization of Kierkegaard and of biblical faith as influences that
could have saved Heidegger from Nazism had he not turned away from them
in favor of Nietzsche and the presocratic Greeks.

Now that the breadth and depth of Heidegger's involvement with
Nazism is clear, the question of the meaning of that involvement looms
over all current critical engagements with Heidegger and his thought.
While most prominent attempts to make sense of this great thinker's
association with a demonic regime, in particular those of Farias, Ott, and
Zimmerman, stress various aspects of Heidegger's social and cultural
milieu, John Caputo's recent Demythologizing Heidegger represents an
interesting contrast in telling a story of great beginnings going horribly
awry because of a tragic flaw, a fatal blind spot, in its protagonist. In so
doing, he periodizes Heidegger's career as a thinker, separating the basically sound and salutary work of the 20s from the dangerously misguided thinking subsequent to Heidegger's return from Marburg to
Freiburg. Adding, as it were, a chapter to Eliza Butler's The Tyranny of
Greece Over Germany, Caputo closely associates Heidegger's movement
toward Nazism with his elevation of the Greeks, especially the
Presocratics, to a unique and privileged status. As compelling and illuminating as Caputo's story is, I find fundamental elements of it highly
questionable and even self-opposed. In particular, I have questions
about the ways Caputo explicitly valorizes the biblical witness as a necessary corrective to philosophy while implicitly pressing a philosophical polemic against fundamental aspects of that biblical witness. It is in
looking closely at Caputo's frequent but tendentious invocations of
Kierkegaard in telling his story that I intend to expose these internal tensions. But first to a brief summary of that story.
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Heidegger's Wrong Kehrung
As I noted above, Caputo wants to distinguish fundamentally the
Heidegger of the 20s from the Heidegger of the 30s and after. He characterizes the project of the earlier Heidegger as follows:
The first Freiburg project, entitled a "hermeneutics of facticity," took
the form of a two-pronged retrieval: on the one hand, of the factical
lifeworld of the New Testament communities, which lay sedimented
beneath the dogmatic ontotheology of the tradition; and, on the other
hand, of the factical lifeworld of Aristotelian ethics, which lay sedimented beneath the metaphysics of ousia. The movements and
rhythms of these "prephilosophical" sources - life before the long
arm of philosophical conceptuality reaches it - were to be the sources
from which philosophy itself would draw a new breath. (DH 3-4)
As Caputo sees it, Heidegger's great insights and his great blindness
combine in this project, just as the Greek tragic hero's distinctive virtue and
tragic flaw are two sides of the same coin. And the common coin, on
Caputo's reading, of Heidegger's insights and blindness, of his triumph
and downfall, is that favorite postmodern denomination, otherness. First,
Heidegger's project of a hermeneutics of facticity shows him to be (despite
his later protestations) an existentialist, a philosopher committed to thinking life in all its thickness and solidity rather than simply playing a conceptual glass bead game. But existence, facticallife, not only always ultimately eludes thought, it disrupts it. Caputo writes:
Heidegger's original strategy - to disrupt philosophy and the university by exposing it to philosophy's other - is brilliantly conceived.
Heidegger wants to let philosophical conceptuality be disrupted by
the concrete experience of life in the New Testament and by Aristotle
conceived in terms of the practical philosophy rather than metaphysics. The disruption of philosophy so conceived was aimed at a
renewal of philosophy, not simply of leaving philosophy behind.
The whole notion of restoring life to its original difficulty, to all of the
concreteness of facticity itself, taken in its original difficulty, to all of
the concreteness of facticity itself, taken in its original Aristotelian
and Kierkegaardian sense, is, I think, an immensely salutary and suggestive move.(DH 57)
A second salutary dimension of otherness Caputo finds in the
"hermeneutics of facticity" project is Heidegger's readiness to bring together those two perennial others, Athens and Jerusalem, the Greek and the
Hebraic. While many culture critics today would see in this a hegemonic
privileging of ancient, patriarchal Mediterranean cultures, Caputo sees
Heidegger's syncretism through the particular lens of the French postmodernist category of the "jewgreek." He writes:
The "jewgreek" is the miscegenated state of one who is neither pure-
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ly Greek nor purely Jewish, who is too philosophical to be a pure Jew
and too biblical to be pure Greek, who is attached to both philosophers and prophets .... (DH 6)
By "jew" I mean above all what Lyotard calls les juifs, so that the
expression"jewgreek" mean(s) everyone who is out, outside, silenced,
deprived of an idiom or home or both, who is either forbidden to use
or has learned to despise his mother tongue, everyone who is
Abrahamic, driven from native land, and, over and beyond Abraham,
everyone who is Ishmaelic, for Ishmael was disowned by Abraham
and Sarah in the name of protecting the purity of their legitimate line.
Jewgreek means Auschwitz, and every other name of ignominy and
suffering, all the Auschwitizes, the victims of all the Nazisms, wherever they are found, in South Africa or the South Bronx, in El Salvador
or Northern Ireland or on the West Bank.(DH 7)

But while Heidegger brilliantly expounded both Paul and Aristotle in his
lectures of the 20s, he is by no stretch of the imagination a champion of
the"jewgreek" as understood by Caputo. Hardly; such champions of the
despised and excluded don't join the Nazi movement. And here lies the
fundamental question for Caputo: How did the same philosopher who so
beneficially opened philosophy to facticallife and Greek thought to Jewish
and Christian faith become a Nazi? In what is to me the most compelling
dimension of this book, Caputo argues that Heidegger's failure to see the
difference between the Jewish and the Greek blinds him to what is distinctively biblical: the identification of justice with response to the needs of
widows and orphans, of strangers and lepers; the elevation of kardia, the
love of the neighbor, as coequal and even equivalent to the love of God.
Caputo shows that Heidegger's reading of Christian texts always focused
on the themes of fighting the good fight, running the race, suffering the
thorn in the flesh, taking up one's cross; all this he construes as versions of
the Greek maxim that all beautiful things are difficult. But he failed to see
that the Greek equations of the good and the beautiful, of excellence and
virtue, are profoundly at odds with the biblical vision. Caputo writes:
So the fabric and texture of facticallife were decidedly different in
the two cases. On the one hand, a hermeneutics of excellence and arete,
of putting everything in order with the order of rank. On the other
hand, a hermeneutics not of glory but of humiliation, not of the strong
and erect but of those who have been laid low, not of the great but of
the small, not of the straight but of the crooked and bent, not of the
beautiful but of the ugly, not of athletes but lepers, not of eudaimonia
but of misery, not of prudence but of mercy, not of order of rank but of
all those who drop to the bottom of wherever a logos and a polemos
shake things down and distribute them into a hierarchy. (DH 62-3)
Caputo convincingly shows that Heidegger was effectively oblivious to
this dimension of the New Testament. But Caputo goes on to claim, first,
that this obliviousness leads to Heidegger's elevation of the Greeks to
mythic status and, further, to his infamous and never recanted involve-
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ment with the Nazis. What case does he make for these claims?
At its least controversial but also lamest, Caputo's indictment is one of
omission rather than commission. In the final two pages of Chapter Two,
he repeats with minor variation an almost ritual incantation:
So there was nothing in Heidegger's appropriation of the New
Testament ... to serve as a precaution against the reading that Ernst
Junger gave to pain .. There was nothing in this hermeneutics to resist
Nietzsche's famous saying ... [that] what does not kill me makes me
stronger. In short, there was nothing in Heidegger's hermeneutics of
factical life in the New Testament to insulate him against the contempt and scorn which Junger and Nietzsche would heap upon New
Testament ethics, ....
There was nothing in Heidegger's appropriation of the New
Testament categories to lead him to look upon the events of history
from the view of the victims of history, ....
There was, as it turned out, nothing ... to stop it from running
straight into Kampf-philosophy, a great myth of Being's struggle in
and through a people chosen by Being's hand .... (DH 58-9)
Now, this is a pretty weak indictment, as Caputo effectively admits with
his completion of the last sentence quoted above: " ... -even as there was
originally nothing about it intrinsically to necessitate such a fateful
turn."(DH 59) How, then, does Caputo build his case for the ambitious
thesis that Heidegger's misreading of the New Testament somehow leads
him to aggrandize hyperbolically the Greeks and to become a Nazi? And
how does he support the initially outrageous claim that immoderate
Hellenophilism somehow predisposes one to or outright causes Nazism?
A clue to answering this question is to be found in the passage just quoted in which Caputo expands his reference to kampf- philosophy with the
phrase, " a great myth of Being's struggle in and through a people chosen
by Being's hand ... "(DH 59) Caputo here refers to Heidegger's belief that
the early Greeks had been granted a special awareness of Being that had
subsequently been lost but which it was now up to the Germans to
reawaken. On the first page of Demythologizing Heidegger, Caputo
describes this belief, which he calls the myth of being, thus:
By [the myth of Being] I mean the tendency of Heidegger to construct a fantastic portrait of the Greek sources of Western thought
and culture - in the most classically German manner - and to represent these Greek sources as a single, surpassing, great "Origin"
(Ursprung), a primordial incipience or "Beginning" (Anfang) of the
West. On such a scheme the Greeks do not represent merely the historical start of certain Western linguistic, scientific, and social traditions. For Heidegger, "Greeks" are nothing merely "historical"
(geschichtlich) at all, but something destining (,?eschicklich), something
steering the very destiny (Geschick) of the West,. ... These Greeks represent an overarching, normative claiming Origin to which "we" and who "we" are is a critical issue here - are all bound more pri-
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mordially than we can say and in reference to which everything later
is to be compared, either as falling away and oblivion or as the scene
of its retrieval."(DH 1)

It is this myth that Caputo targets in titling his book, Demythologizing
Heidegger. According to Caputo, it is this dimension of Heidegger's
thought that needs to be exposed, questioned, deconstructed and removed
if that thought is to be rehabilitated and employed by right thinking people
today; for it is this aspect of Heidegger's thought that marked it as genuinely Nazi. He writes:
It cannot be forgotten that it was in the context of the National
Socialist seizure of power that Heidegger narrowed down the beginnings of the West to a single "Origin" - Anfang and Ursprung purely Greek, without Jewish and Christian contamination, and tied
the future of the West to the German future, to the German capacity
for thinking and questioning Being. The first form of the myth of
Being is a political myth tied to a hellish ideology, fully equipped
with robust and quite bellicose Greek gods and their German heirs,
in which Heidegger undertook to produce a thought of Being that
was judenrein, thereby reproducing on the level of thinking what the
Nazis were doing in the streets.(DH 4)

As Caputo tells it, Heidegger's failure to grasp the distinctiveness of the
New Testament (as opposed to the Greeks) leads to a onesided emphasis
on struggle and strife, or, to use his loaded term, kampf. This, in turn,
leaves Heidegger prone to the anti-Christian diatribes of JUnger and
Nietzsche and thus leads to an attempt to purge all Semitic elements from
his thought so as to fulfill the Germanic mission of retrieving that which is
pure Greek. And this is the intellectual analog to Hitler's project of
reestablishing Aryan racial purity.
As a work of historical explanation, this narrative is highly questionable.
First, huge gaps loom between causes and effects. For example, one could
well emphasize the stress and struggle aspects of the New Testament - one
thinks of Karl Barth's commentary on Romans in which militaristic
imagery abounds - without ultimately becoming either anti-Christian or
Nazi. And one could respond positively to Nietzsche's anti-Christian diatribes without feeling any attraction to the Nazis. Further, Caputo's
account seems self-opposed. Heidegger's failure to see the difference
between Greek and New Testament values ultimately leads him to purge
all traces of the New Testament from his thought because of its perceived
difference from the Greek? Ultimately, if we judge Caputo's book as a
piece of historical explanation, it is a failure.
But it is a mistake to read Caputo's book as a rival historical and biographical explanation to those of, say, Ott and Zimmerman. Just as
Bultmann's project of demythologizing focused on the contemporary-significance of the biblical kerygma, Caputo's Demythologizing Heidegger
focuses on the contemporary significance of Heidegger's thought. But
Caputo uses the word "demythologizing" with a caveat: he denies that it is
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possible to arrive at some naked, absolute truth through such a process.
Since, as he sees it, we always view reality through one myth or another,
myth here designating broadly a contingent conceptual or narrative
scheme, to demythologize is really to remythologize. By his own admission, then, Caputo is constructing a mythic account of Heidegger which,
like Heidegger's mythic accounts of the Greeks, is intended to guide and
shape contemporary thinking and acting rather than just to contemplate
the past. The real point of Caputo's book is to denounce as Nazi in spirit
any attempt to single out, to privilege, to keep pure anyone people or culture or faith. In presenting the cautionary tale of how Heidegger went
astray, Caputo effectively makes a plea for the vision that sails today under
the flag of multiculturalism. He writes:
The result, or one possible result, of this demythologizing is a
world that, with the exception of its ecologism, Heidegger - the man would abhor. It is a multilingual, multicultural, miscegenated, polymorphic, pluralistic world without national-ethnic unity, without the
unity of a single language or a deep monolinguistic tradition. It is a
world of gay rights and feminists, of radically democratic, anti-hierarchical, anti-elitist structures, with a pragmatic view of truth and
principles, and in which children would be educated not in a classical
Gymnasium but in free public institutions with schools in which
Andy Warhol would get as big a hearing as Sophocles and
Aeschylus, schools filled with computers and the latest technological
advances, schools that would make a particular effort to reach the
disadvantaged. Heidegger would rather be dead. (DH 97)

Caputo's Kierkegaard
Caputo's intention to read the Heidegger affair as a cautionary tale full
of present significance is reflected in the way that Caputo constantly uses
the contemporary thinkers, Levinas, Lyotard, and Derrida, as foils to
expose what is right and what is wrong with Heidegger's thinking.! But
given this prospective emphasis on how these three French thinkers develop elements of Heidegger in very different ways than Heidegger did, what
sense can we make of Caputo's retrospective emphasis on Kierkegaard?
Throughout Caputo's narrative of Heidegger's development, Kierkegaard
figures decisively. First, Heidegger's varying relations to the Dane serve to
demarcate both the beginning and the end of the salutary "hermeneutics of
facticity" stretch of the Denkweg. As Caputo sees it, Heidegger's first
(good) Kehrung coincides with his discovery of Kierkegaard. The second
(bad) Kehrung, in turn, coincides with Heidegger's turning away from
Kierkegaard to greater involvement with Nietzsche, H6lderlin and the
Presocratics. (DH 5-6) Second, Caputo uses images from Kierkegaard to
characterize the fundamental mood and tendency of Heidegger's thought.
(DH 62) Third, Caputo identifies crucial elements of Heidegger's thought
as more or less modified (and frequently unacknowledged) borrowings
from Kierkegaard. (DH 48,181) Fourth, he uses Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms to parody the grandiosity of Heidegger at his worst.(DH 74)
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Finally and most controversially, Caputo tightly links Kierkegaard with
three French postmodemists that figure prominently in his account of the
Heidegger affair: Levinas, Lyotard, and Derrida.
In his conclusion, Caputo writes:
What is missing from Heidegger, what Heidegger always missed
and excluded, what he never managed to think or come to grips
with, is the jewgreek economy that runs through Kierkegaard,
Levinas, Derrida, and Lyotard .... (DH 211)
With this linking of names, Caputo takes a position on the controversial
question of Kierkegaard and postmodemism. Frequently, arguments for
such an alignment are couched in terms of Kierkegaard's rhetorical strategies, his use of pseudonymity and irony, his penchant for constructing selfconsuming literary artifacts. But in speaking of a shared "jewgreek economy," Caputo makes his case for so aligning Kierkegaard on a broader and
more substantial basis. Most straightforwardly, "jewgreek" denotes a joining of the Hebraic and the Hellenic, the spiritual commerce between
Athens and Jerusalem. So co-implicated are "jew" and "greek" in
Kierkegaard that it has always been impossible to classify him neatly as a
philosopher or as a theologian. He works the faultlines that lie between
the two, always insisting on their difference but never allowing either to go
its way undisturbed by the other. As Caputo points out, such a bringing
together of the biblical and the philosophical is nowhere more evident in
the twentieth century than in Levinas. He further argues for a similar if
more subtle interweaving of the two in Derrida. 2 But Caputo's aligning of
Kierkegaard with the French postmodemists is based on more than some
generic bringing together of the Greek and the Jewish. Caputo insists on a
richer significance of the term:
Jewgreek thinking watches very closely to see what philosophy
abolishes as irrational, unnatural, and particularist in virtue of the
intimidating power and prestige of reason, nature, universality, and
humanity.(DH 211)
The jewgreek is not other than philosophy, not simply other,
because we - who are "we"?- are all Greek, always and already
Greek, and philosophical conceptuality is - for those of us who have
been enculturated in the Euro-world - an inescapable given. But by
putting the question of the other to philosophy, jewgreek thinking in
fact raises the question of the other of philosophy. The jewgreek
experience of the other, the passionate intensity of a jewgreek poetics
or quasi-ethics of mercy or kardia, irrupts in the center of philosophy
and disrupts its project of comprehension ... .The oddity and impurity
of the jewgreek is its focus on what has been "excluded," its hyperbolic sensitivity to the claim of the other, its demand for justice for the
least among us, for the despised, the different, the dispossessed, and
the helpless.(DH 212-213)
Caputo has chosen well in making this concept, "jewgreek," the site for

DECONSTRUCTING CAPUTO ON HElD EGGER

35

an alignment of Kierkegaard with French postmodernism. The shared
themes that emerge as Caputo unpacks the concept are unmistakable.
There is a shared interest in saving the particular from subsumption under
the universal, a questioning of the way "reason" functions to legitimate the
power of the powerful, a protest against the disinterested "project of comprehension," and a statement of the claims of the neighbor (in the biblical
sense of the term). On these points, all of which involve pressing the
claims of some other against some monolithic sameness, I wholeheartedly
concur with Caputo that Kierkegaard is the spiritual and intellectual comrade of the French postmodernists.
But something is very strange about Caputo's project of alignment,
nonetheless. To see this, we need to return to the topic of myth. The
book's title, of course, is Demythologizing Heidegger. As Caputo points out,
"demythologizing" may easily be mistaken to denote a distilling of fact
from fiction. But Caputo denies the possibility of escaping myth. Instead,
he contrasts pernicious myth and beneficial myth .
... [I]t is not a question of getting beyond myth or laying aside
metaphysics, but rather of inventing new and more salutary myths,
or of recovering other and older myths, myths to counter the destructive myths of violence, domination, patriarchy, and hierarchy... The
issue, then, is not divided between mythologizing and demythologizing ... but between dangerous myths and salutary myths; between
privileging, elitist, and hierarchizing myths and myths that promote
justice and multiplicity; between exclusionary and oppressive myths
and liberating, empowering myths.
The question of "demythologizing Heidegger" then comes down
to the task of disrupting the myth of Being with the myth of
Justice .... (DH 3)
There is something disturbingly circular about Caputo's proposal here
to use one myth, the myth of Justice, as the criterion by which to judge
whether other myths are salutary or dangerous. For the question is close at
hand as to the legitimacy (the salutary character!) of the myth of Justice
itself. When we recall the etymological connection of "salutary" to the
Latin "salus"(=health), we see that Caputo has described the evaluation of
myths in surprisingly Nietzschean terms. In his revaluation of values,
Nietzsche labels Caputo's "myth of justice" (i.e. love for "the least of
these") as dangerous and the "privileging, elitist, hierarchizing myths"
(though certainly not the "myth of Being") as salutary. Caputo's refusal to
move beyond talk of myth to assert the objective truth of (at least some)
value claims makes it difficult to see how he could adequately respond to
such challenges. 3 But Caputo is wedded, nonetheless to speaking of a
myth of justice because he believes justice is necessarily utopian, an ideal
unrealized and unrealizable at any time or place.
... [T]o instantiate a mythic structure, to say it was actualized here
or there, in some place or people, some language or age, is to institute
privileged times and privileged places, to authorize hierarchization
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and elitist rank-orderings among existing beings. Justice cannot be
localized, pinned down to a place or a time. The myth of justice does
not take the form of a geophilosophical myth precisely because it is a
myth of what is owed to the homeless and uprooted. The condition
of the possibility of a salutary myth, which is also its condition of
impossibility, is that it is not actual. Justice does not belong to a time
that can be recalled, recollected, interiorized, repeated, to a time that
was or has been all along, but to time immemorial, a time remembered, to unrememberable time, an impossible time that never was
actual even as it calls out incessantly for actualization. Or to a place,
to some land or soil, some nation or fatherland.
That brings us in sharp contrast with Heidegger's mythologizing
operation, which, as we have seen, consists precisely in locating the
mythic space in actuality, giving it a historical name, attaching it to
"this people" (two of them, actually)[Greece and Germany]. The
whole idea behind the myth of justice is to avoid playing
favorites, which is why the myth of justice is betrayed by locating a
chosen people (the Jews), or the people of God (the Christians), as if
some people were and some people were not God's, as if God prefers
Jews to Egyptians, Christians to Jews, Europeans to non-Westerners,
and so on. The whole idea of justice is not to exclude anyone from
the kingdom, which means the kingdom is nowhere in
particular.(DH190)

It is in this passage that the radical incompatibility of Kierkegaard and
Caputo emerges. Undoubtedly, the universality of God's love is a fundamental Kierkegaardian theme. But note that Caputo, while appealing to
Kierkegaard, actually reverses Kierkegaard's characterization of the Greek
and the Christian. For Caputo, Heidegger went astray by crediting some
of the Greeks with a special insight and, consequently, a unique standing.
Caputo challenges and subverts such privilegings by invoking the universality implicit in biblical demands for love and justice.
In contrast, Kierkegaard, especially in the Climacus texts, associates the
Greeks with universality, with the idea that the truth is within us all and
only needs to be recollected, perhaps under the guidance of a Socratic
teacher. In the Postscript, he labels this perspective Religiousness A.
Further, Kierkegaard identifies Christianity (=Religiousness B) with the
scandalous notion that humans have somehow divorced themselves from
the truth and can only be restored to the truth by a special relation to a special teacher, the god-man, who appeared at a particular time and a particular place.
Thus, where Caputo condemns the privileged particularity of
Heidegger's "pure Greek" myth of Being and seeks to correct it with biblical universality, Kierkegaard associates universality with the Greeks and
the scandal of privileged particularity with the Christian notion that no one
can come to God except through the Son, Jesus. This Christian notion of
privileged particularity has, of course, its analog in the Jewish self-identification as God's chosen people. Caputo notes these claims to particular
privileged status in the quotation above, but he dismisses them as unfortu-
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nate departures from the core biblical message of equality and universality.
Kierkegaard, in contrast, makes such claims the scandalous essence of
Christian ity.
Is the disagreement between Caputo and Kierkegaard simply a matter
of the two identifying different aspects of Christianity as the kerygma of
the faith? No. For Kierkegaard agrees with Caputo that the love of the
neighbor is the heart and soul of biblical faith. But, unlike Caputo,
Kierkegaard sees that ethical message as indissolubly linked to the revelationa 1 character of that faith. In Works of Love, a text Caputo nowhere cites
in this book, Kierkegaard argues that the Christian command to love one's
neighbor as oneself is a scandal and bafflement to human reason. It is an
ethical view that "did not rise up in any human's heart":
You shall love - this, then, is the word of the royal law. And truly,
my reader, if you are capable of forming a conception of the conditions in the world before these words were spoken, or if you strive to
understand yourself and give heed to the lives and dispositions of
those who, although they call themselves Christians, really live within pagan concepts - then in relation to this Christian imperative, as
in relation to everything Christian, you will humbly confess with the
wonder of faith that such a command did not spring up in any
human heart.... What courage it takes to say for the first time, "You
shall love," or, more correctly, what divine authority it takes to tum
natural man's conceptions and ideas upside-down with this phrase!
For there at the boundary where human speech halts and courage
forsakes one, there revelation breaks forth with divine creativeness
and proclaims what it is not difficult to understand in the sense of
profundity or human parallels, but which still did not rise up in any
human heart....(WL 40-41)
All this is rather too ontotheologic for Caputo. For to acknowledge
such a God is to fall into just the sorts of bad myths of monogenesis and
presence and hierarchy and actuality which Caputo argues led to
Heidegger's Nazism. Caputo's resistance to the idea of a transcendent, real
God is evident when he uses Derrida to correct Levinas's "ethico-theo-logical" excesses.
The Levinasian gesture that requires deconstruction, even
demythologization, is to reify this infinity [of the demands of justice],
to make it a metaphysical being - which Levinas cannot call Being
and will not call a mere fiction. The Levinasian gesture is like the
Heideggerian to just this extent: that it attributes actuality or reality to
what it valorizes, that it claims this infinity is real, ad literam, ad infinitum. But in Derrida, the quasi infinity of undeconstructible justice is
neither Being nor otherwise than Being; the excess is not the excess of
being but the excess of a linguistic performance .... (DH 200)
To see how far Caputo and Derrida are from Kierkegaard on this point I
recommend Merold Westphal's recent work showing that Kierkegaard's
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notion of God is much more robustly transcendent than is Levinas's.'
But Kierkegaard's theological benightedness, by Caputo's standards,
involves a transgression even worse than belief in a transcendent,
"ontotheologic" God. As Kierkegaard sees it, God's revelation of the
"royal law" to love one's neighbor is radically particular: first, through the
Old Testament prophets and then, preeminently, through the life and
death of Jesus. Kierkegaard's belief in the unique revelational status of a
particular Semitic tribe and a peculiar Judean carpenter is formally identical to Heidegger's belief in the unique revelational status of the presocratic
Greeks. Not only does this observation make Caputo's enlisting of
Kierkegaard in his project of "demythologizing Heidegger" highly questionable but it exposes how outrageous Caputo's explanation of
Heidegger's Nazism really is. For Caputo fundamentally doesn't trace
Heidegger's Nazism to particular features of the presocratics Greeks and
their vision of Being. Rather, it is the sin of privileging, of singling out one
people or time or event or revelation or savior over others, per se, that
Caputo decries. He makes this clear on the first page of his book in a passage already quoted above. There, Caputo asserts that the Greeks represent for Heidegger "an overarching normative claiming to which we and who "we" are is a critical issue here - are all bound more primordially than we can say and in reference to which everything later is to be compared, either as a falling away and oblivion or as the scene of its
retrieval."(DH 1) Note that such a broadly stated indictment sweeps up a
host of faiths and ideologies that are indexed to some particular, normative
origin - most notably for our purposes God's covenant with Abraham in
the case of the Jews and God's revelation of Godself in Jesus for Christians,
but also potentially the American political ideology that attributes such a
normative status to the Declaration of Independence and Constitution.
The problem is that there are many differences between the particularities that are singled out as normative. And it is Caputo's failure to attend
to these differences in the various particularisms that leads him to tar them
all with a single brush. Nazi particularism is racist - the Aryan race is
regarded as uniquely worthy and gifted. In contrast, the particular significance of the Greeks for Heidegger relates to the special revelation of Being
he believed them to have received. Note that Heidegger thought that
vision of Being was crucially important to humankind generally, and he
accordingly devoted much of his philosophical career to communicating
that vision to the modern world. While the significance of the Greek
understanding of Being is universal, the source and much more importantly the idiom of that understanding is particular. According to Heidegger,
Greek and its linguistic soulmate, German, are uniquely conducive to
philosophical thought - thus leading Heidegger to assert that the French
need to learn German if they really want to think philosophically. While
this assertion of linguistic particularism is implausible and offensive, it
isn't exclusive in the same way that Nazism is. It is easier to learn German
than it is to become Aryan. Further, Heidegger's linguistic particularism
doesn't obviously set anyone outside the pale of ethical consideration in
the way Nazism does. Jewish particularism, in turn, relates to the belief
that Jews are the chosen people, that they stand in a special covenental
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relation to God. But while being Jewish is (typically) a matter of lineage,
there is a strong sense in Biblical Judaism that the Jewish people's particular relation to God is of universal significance, that all the nations of the
earth will come to the mountain of the Lord and be blessed through the
special covenant of God with the Jewish people. (Micah 4) This self-overcoming version of particularism receives an even more definite expression
in Christianity. Jesus Christ, the particular man, living and dying at a particular place and time, is the one who overcomes all particularities, male
and female, Jew and Gentile, slave and free, rich and poor. And as
Kierkegaard so frequently notes, before the paradox of the incarnate God,
the relative distinctions between the clever and the simple are set at
nought.
It is clear then that there are big differences in the particularities
affirmed in these various cases. In at least one instance, the Nazis, the
exclusion of others from ethical regard follows naturally from the form of
particularity affirmed. But in the case of Heidegger's Greeks, such a consequence is dubious, and in the cases of Judaism and Christianity, it is explicitly excluded by the specific character of the particularity affirmed. Once
again, the problem is that Caputo doesn't make these distinctions. Rather,
it is the privileging of any particularity, per se, that he targets. In a passage
quoted above, Caputo opposed the myth of justice to any notion of a chosen people (the Jews) or a people of God (Christians), to any notion of a
privileged time or place, to any "elitist rank orderings among existing
beings," (DH 190) since he views all such assignments of ultimate significance to particularities as inevitably exclusionary. He writes, "The whole
idea of justice is not to exclude anyone from the kingdom, which means
the kingdom is nowhere in particular."(DH 190) But what of a privileged
epistemological particularity (a revelation) or a privileged soteriological
particularity (a savior) that was both of ultimate significance and yet not
exclusionary in the way Caputo finds objectionable? Why can't one who
believes that God has uniquely revealed Godself in Jesus also insist on
treating even those who don't share such a belief with the respect they
deserve as children of God and beneficiaries of Christ's self-sacrificial love?
Kierkegaard, for one, believed that such a conclusion should be drawn.
Caputo, in contrast, thinks that all claims of unique significance for particularities, be they races, nations, people, or revelations, all notions of "pri_
mordial incipience" and "monogenesis," are inherently invidiously exclusionary and are thus "dangerous" and "oppressive." So, in spite of his
claim to invoke Christianity as a corrective to Heidegger's Nazism, in spite
of his assertion that Heideggers movement toward Nazism began with a
flawed reading of biblical texts and culminated in a purging of biblical
traces from his thought, Caputo implicitly accuses Christianity and every
other religion that appeals to special revelation of Nazi tendencies.
In closing, I will comment on this essay's title, "Deconstructing
Caputo's Demythologizing Heidegger." I take deconstruction to designate
reading a text so as to find tendencies and implications that are different
from and even directly opposed to the explicit, self-described project of the
text. We see a number of such internal rifts in Caputo's book. First,
though it presents itself preeminently as a historical text reconstructing the
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development of Heidegger's thought, I have argued that it is more plausibly read as a plea for a particular version of "multiculturalism." Second,
though Caputo repeatedly invokes Kierkegaard as a corrective to
Heidegger, his criticisms of Heidegger are so diffuse as to include
Kierkegaard as well. Third, while it is overtly an impassioned plea for the
biblical witness to leaven the philosophical loaf, Caputo's book actually
represents a slander against that biblical witness. In asserting that
Heidegger's thought is genuinely Nazi because of his belief that something
had been uniquely revealed to the Greeks, Caputo is actually labeling all
claims to special revelation as fundamentally Nazi in character. Finally,
after (correctly) accusing Heidegger of failing to adequately distinguish
between the Greek and the Christian, Caputo himself fails to distinguish
the various particularities characteristic of Nazis, Heidegger's Greeks,
Judaism and Christianity, respectively.
For an author who touts the post-modern liberation from the sterility of
Enlightenment Rationalism, Caputo's fundamental argument is ironically
reminiscent of Lessing's Nathan the Wise: people of various faiths can get
along with each other by renouncing claims to special revelation and by
emphasizing those faiths' common ethical teachings. And Caputo's belief
that the "myth of justice" at the heart of the biblical tradition can be separated from those parts of the tradition that speak of chosen people, unique
incarnation, and special revelation is distinctly similar to Kant's attempt in
Religion within the Bounds of Reason Alone to refine the ethical gold of the
Christian religion out of its mixture with superstitious slag.
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